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ABSTRACT
Recent migration ‘crises’ raise important geopolitical questions.
Who is ‘the migrant’ that contemporary politics are fixated on?
How are answers to ‘who counts as a migrant’ changing? Who
gets to do that counting, and under what circumstances? This
forum responds to, as well as questions, the current saliency of
migration by examining how categories of migration hold geopo-
litical significance—not only in how they are constructed and by
whom, but also in how they are challenged and subverted.
Furthermore, by examining how the very concepts of ‘migrant’
and ‘refugee’ are used in different contexts, and for a variety of
purposes, it opens up critical questions about mobility, citizenship
and the nation state. Collectively, these contributions aim to
demonstrate how problematising migration and its categorisation
can be a tool of enquiry into other phenomena and processes.
Introduction to the Forum
William Allen and Bridget Anderson
Europe, we are told, faces a ‘migration crisis’, if not multiple crises linked in
global political imaginations.1 This provides an opportunity to revisit key ques-
tions about migration. How is ‘who counts as a migrant’ changing? Who is
getting to do that counting, and under what geopolitical circumstances?Why do
these developments matter for policy, political action and migrants and citizens
themselves? Categorisation is central to efforts to govern migrants and refugees,
whether through formal or informalmeans and channels. Not only do categories
make some people visible while making others invisible, they also set standards
and normalise practices. However, moments of crises can reveal frictions,
inconsistencies and ambiguities in these processes that appear at all scales:
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individuals, cities, states and supra-national organisations. The study of geopo-
litics, as an enterprise concerned with ‘provid[ing] explanations of how politics
and geography intersect to make the world the way it is’,2 is well-suited for
accommodating these kinds of questions about mobility. Indeed, the very sub-
ject of mobility invites discussions about places, politics and their complex,
contingent inter-relations.
While crises, real or perceived, may be particularly timely moments for
revealing these aspects of categorisation, contemporary geopolitical research
continues to question the importance and effectiveness of categories in see-
mingly ‘ordinary’ contexts of mobility. For example, migrants’ journeys—owing
to their fluid, recursive or largely unpredictable natures—blur the artificially
orderly lines among ‘origin’, ‘transit’ and ‘destination’ countries.3 Moreover,
efforts to draw out categories are themselves political acts: some critical scholars
emphasise that as people—including researchers like ourselves in this forum—
observe societies, they also enact, change and contribute to them.4
Drawing inspiration from these developments, this forum aims to rethink
some of the concepts that the field of migration studies, if it can be called a single
field,5 tends to take for granted: the ‘migrant’, the ‘refugee’ and the ‘citizen’. Part
of this rethinking was prompted by critical reflection on the apparent novelty
and salience of migration. But the notion that migration is a peculiarly con-
temporary issue actually sits at odds with global histories of trade, colonialism,
transportation and vagrancy, largely because such mobilities have not been
understood as ‘migration’ in the first place.6 Beginning with the movement of
early humans from Africa, mobility has shaped, reinforced and undermined
institutions and power relations.7 As ‘migrants’ emerged as a population to be
governed and controlled, so too did the global citizenship regime. In some ways,
migrants are central to the development of the modern nation state.8
Admittedly, there has been considerable academic critique of the usefulness of
concepts like ‘the state’, ‘the market’ and ‘civil society’ that make up the traditional
tools of liberal politics and sociology, as well as significant shifts in ways of
thinking about power. But these have not filtered into public discourse: the state
and government continue to be the frame through which it understands the
distribution and accountability of political and economic power. Yet, this frame
is increasingly fractured and shaky. Borders have fallen and shifted, exhibiting
vulnerabilities while also exacting violence.9 Global capital, finance and new
technologies are proving resistant to regulation. Crises of representation exacer-
bate these changes: large portions of voters across Europe, adversely affected by
national shifts towards austerity while also sceptical of further EU integration,
increasingly feel disconnected from—and are turning their backs on—mainstream
political parties and ‘elites’.10
At the same time, we are experiencing the slow withdrawal of the
privilege of the Global North. Recently, there has been a massive shift in
production from North to South. John Smith has argued that outsourcing
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has been a powerful means of wage repression and profiteering.11 He
demonstrated that developing countries’ share of global manufactured
exports rose from around 5% in the 1950s to some 60% currently. The
proportion of the industrial workforce living in less developed regions has
risen from 34% in 1950 to 79% in 2010.12 Now, 83% of the world’s
manufacturing workers live in the global south. Wages in many of these
regions, he argues, are forced below the value of labour power. While there
are problems with taxonomies of North and South, for most people in the
world, where you are born accounts for your share of global wealth. And
goods are affordable for impoverished workers (and non-workers) in the
Global North because of a system of resource extraction, outsourcing and
arms-length exploitation in the Global South.
This is the context within which we see the obsession with immigration.
But who is the ‘migrant’ that contemporary politics is so fixated on? The
essays we have collected illustrate how this figure is differently constituted in
different places. State policies at national and local levels, enforcement
actions and practices of migrants and citizens themselves combine to create
‘the migrant’. This in turn is giving rise to new geopolitical arrangements,
relations and understandings.
Madeleine Sumption’s piece discusses the state’s need for quantitative data
and analysis to inform policymaking, and the challenges of reconciling immi-
gration as sets of legal categories with immigration as sets of practices. For
example, just because people enter under the category of ‘spouse’ does not mean
that they are not employed. She advocates using administrative data and linking
datasets to provide a richer picture of migrants’ lives. Such an approach poten-
tially shows migrants as embedded in national populations and makes connec-
tions between the experiences of citizens and the experiences of migrants.
However, there is a need to make the politics of such analyses explicit: she
notes that making populations legible inevitably introduces risks. These risks are
attendant on quantitative and qualitative research on migration more generally.
The challenge of migration statistics is the favoured status they confer
to legal categories. We can learn much from history on the regulation and
management of both human mobility and heterogeneity, particularly in
reference to fixing racial and ethnic identities. Scholars have documented,
often in meticulous detail, the efforts made to classify natives; place them
in hierarchies; differentiate them by culture, race, personality and intelli-
gence; and class them as indigenous, tribal and urban. This has not really
been reflected in debates about migration. Yet, the law lends consequence
to elements of social identity—including race, gender and religion—by
investing them with legal consequences of inclusion and privilege or
exclusion and subordination. Ian Hacking has written about the human
sciences ‘making up people’ and the ways in which our investigations, as
well as classification schemes implied within them, also group particular
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people as objects of scientific inquiry, thereby interacting with and chan-
ging them.13 Meanwhile, legal categories such as ‘refugee’ come out of
particular moments in history, revealing the primacy of (geo)politics—not
law—in deciding who counts.14
So, laws and policies not only ‘manage migration’, but also are critical to
the very production of social relations. They interact with how people
imagine both themselves and immigrants.15 This is illustrated in Jennifer
Hough’s piece on the words used for North Korean defectors/refugees/
settlers. She explores how each term has its own weight, while also bringing
access to certain benefits. But these terms also have temporalities: her
research participants reveal how they might be less resistant to being distin-
guished as a ‘migrant’ on arrival, when requiring certain services or exemp-
tions, but resent such distinction over time. ‘Migrants’ or ‘refugees’, in
common with other forms of categorisation, may seek visibility and invisi-
bility depending on the context.
Thus, being a migrant is embedded in national, geopolitical histories, as
both Hough’s and Lena Rose’s essays demonstrate. The latter argues that
assumptions about European secularisation need to be revisited in order to
respond to tensions between lived religion and the secular state. Taking a
longer chronological perspective, we can see that religion, as well as (or instead
of) nation, race and ethnicity, has provided the terms through which the
foreigner has been perceived and received. Attending to the situations and
experiences of migrants enables us to better understand contemporary ‘host’
societies and their efforts towards ‘integration’.
However, addressing who counts as migrants also requires paying atten-
tion to staying put, or more specifically, the ways in which people move away
from, mobilise against or endure challenging conditions. These three trajec-
tories require different capacities and powers that collective or transnational
activities can enhance, as Nicholas Van Hear argues. Almost everyone is
mobility implicated: those who want no part of a globalised world are
nevertheless part of one. Thus, migration is not just about migrants, but is
entangled with multiple policies, practices and processes that stretch across
time, spaces and places.
These entanglements continue to produce new geopolitical arrangements
and relations of governance. As seen through the experiences of Roma in
London, documented by Rachel Humphris and Sarah Walker, responses to
beggars and begging now involve many kinds of groups who previously
perhaps did not come together: local police in ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’
countries, voluntary sector organisations and agencies of the state.
Meanwhile, Franck Düvell’s observations reveal how the Turkish government
and the EU continue to use migration issues to achieve policy objectives,
sometimes in conflicting ways. One of these ways involves calling Syrians in
Turkey ‘brothers’ or ‘guests’ instead of refugees.
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These reflections raise questions not only about how the very categories of
migrants and refugees are changing inmoments of crises, but also howprocesses of
categorisation and governance have wider geopolitical implications for our under-
standings of nations, states and citizens. At a more fundamental level, this forum
also illustrates how migration can be a lens that enables us to better understand
ourselves. As migrants slip in and out of their political and policy typologies, they
reveal the inherent instability of the nation state project. Situating social scientific
investigations within a continuous reflection on how and why migration is made
an object of discourse and policy—as well as how it is rationalised, analysed and
classified to produce different kinds of knowledge—potentially transforms the
problematisation of migration into a tool for inquiry. We hope that this collection
is a step towards doing so.
Staying Power: Mobility, Mobilisation and Endurance in Times of
Geopolitical Upheaval
Nicholas Van Hear
As recent commentary on the worldwide rise of populism and nativism has
highlighted, the ascendancy of the neo-liberal variant of globalisation over
the last three decades or so has generated opportunities for some and made
life harder for others. Political debate has developed a new nomenclature of
the ‘left’, finally coming to terms with the ‘left behind’, the ‘left out’, the ‘left
aside’ and the ‘left overs’.
Given this context, it is important to understand how people fashion
ways of making a life worth living in the face of the upheavals wrought by
neoliberal globalisation. By ‘a life worth living’ I mean not just basic
security and means of livelihood (in other words survival or coping), but
dignity, a decent life for oneself, one’s family and others who are close. I
characterise this search for lives worth living in terms of mobility, mobi-
lisation and endurance.16 Mobility includes the experiences and forces that
shape moving from adversity as a means of securing a better life. By
mobilisation, I mean disparate forms of politics—overt and covert, explicit
and implicit—that people engage in to improve their lives. Endurance
refers to the capacity to live through adverse conditions by staying put.
The purpose of this piece is to draw out some of the connections between
these three pathways, and, by extension, to point to ‘who counts in crises’
as the subject of this forum.
What shapes people’s capacity and choice to move, mobilise or endure? In
a word, power. Differing resources and competences are needed to move
from, mobilise against or endure economic decline, loss of livelihood, conflict
and insecurity, environmental degradation, invasion of public space and
other challenges that neoliberal globalisation brings. These capacities are
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drawn from one’s socioeconomic position, standing and networks, but also
rely on inner resources of emotional and mental strength. In aggregate, I
conceive these attributes in terms of power.
In the sphere of mobility, the capacity to choose between moving and
staying we may call moving power. Abilities to move and choices of destina-
tion depend on access to resources like money and networks.17 Mobility also
involves those would like to move but for various reasons cannot—‘would be
migrants’18—and relatives, friends and acquaintances of those who leave.
Thus, migration is not just about migrants. These would be migrants and
stayers can be considered ‘mobility imbued’ since their life worlds are at least
partly shaped by the mobility of others. So too, albeit less directly, are those
in the wider population who may have no desire or intention to move. Let us
call these the ‘mobility-implicated’, since, like it or not, they are influenced by
the mobility of people, money, ideas and things worldwide. The proportion
of people who are mobile, mobility-imbued or mobility-implicated varies
from society to society and over time.
In the sphere of mobilisation, the capacity to engage in political activity we
may term mobilising power. Depending on the resources available, as well as
the political climate, such activity may take the form of ‘subterranean
politics’19 or ‘everyday subsistence politics’20: local struggles in workplaces
and neighbourhoods, and over housing, schools or public space, for example.
At times, such everyday politics may coalesce into wider movements in the
public sphere: mass public mobilisation, like the ‘squares’ protests from 2011
onwards, including the Arab and other ‘springs’ and ‘awakenings’, the
Indignados, Occupy, Istanbul’s Gezi Park protest and other forms of con-
tentious politics.21 Sometimes this may transmute into more conventional
electoral politics, as in Greece (Syriza) and Spain (Podemos). Many of these
forms of mobilisation are marked by a turning away from the established
political order. They can take ‘illiberal’ forms, as seen in the attraction of
populist, religious, nationalist, nativist, ethnic and other fundamentalist
movements involving exclusionary identity politics and illiberal or sometimes
anti-liberal insurgencies.
People may neither move to escape adverse conditions nor mobilise to
contest them, but endure them instead: a third trajectory. This requires
staying power and may draw on resources different from moving power
and mobilising power—for example, particular forms of stamina and
mental fortitude. The term ‘staying power’ is deliberately chosen here to
denote the capacity to stay put, coupled with its vernacular meaning of the
capacity to endure challenging conditions. Such activity could also be cast
as the desire for continuity rather than change through movement whether
in the form of mobility or mobilisation. Indeed, the argument could be
made that in an age of upheaval wrought by turbo-capitalism, perhaps the
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most radical responses are to be still, to maintain continuity in the face of
relentless turbulence.
This endurance trajectory should not be seen as a passive, residual or
default option, but as a sometimes deliberate or conscious choice.22 It is not
what is left over when neither mobility nor mobilisation is pursued; rather
endurance is a third trajectory of choosing to see out difficult circumstances.
‘Staying power’ is thus the counterpart of the powers both to move and to
mobilise.
These powers and capacities, held by individuals and perhaps by house-
holds, can accumulate and shift over time. But these powers can be enhanced
in two other ways. Individual capacities may coalesce into collective activity.
Mobilisation is typically a collective political activity, but mobility can also
take collective form—as we have seen during the ‘migration crisis’ of
2015–2016. Endurance, too, may be collective under some circumstances.
When activities become collective, the power accumulated is more than the
sum or aggregation of individual power: it is cumulative rather than
incremental. Second, power can be enhanced when the different spheres of
mobility, mobilisation and endurance combine. Again the effect may be
cumulative rather than incremental. Migrants provide transnational support
to those who mobilise or endure in the homeland. By sending remittances
and other contributions to families and friends, or community projects
(schools, health care, and other public enterprises), those who have moved
away can enhance the staying power of those who remain. Furthermore, by
lobbying in their countries of settlement, transferring money or communi-
cating ideas, those who have moved away may enhance the mobilising power
of those who stay and contest adverse conditions, which is how diaspora
politics work.23
Mobilisation can also happen among mobile populations when they
engage in the ‘mobile commons’.24 This was seen in migrant actions during
the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015-2016: marching en masse to borders in defiance
of the authorities, breaking down border fences collectively and squatting in
disused property rather than living in approved spaces. It is also seen in
everyday acts of solidarity and mutual aid en route. When moving power
combines with mobilising or staying power, more than the sum of particular
powers is accumulated.
This tripartite schema—moving power, mobilising power and staying
power—resonates to some degree with the classic Hirschman triad of ‘exit,
voice and loyalty’.25 This has been revisited lately and re-cast from the
methodological nationalism in which it was conceived to account for the
transnationalism paradigm currently dominant in migration studies. Instead
of either exit or voice, one increasing while the other diminishes, we can see
that through transnational connections, exit can operate in concert with
voice or even become voice: voice is ‘transnationalised’.26 The framework
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suggested here differs from the Hirschman scheme in its attention to the
differential power or capacity to pursue the three trajectories, and the notion
of staying power is somewhat different from Hirschman’s ‘loyalty’, which is
underdeveloped in his scheme. It also differs from Hirschman by underlining
the cumulative power that can be the outcome of various combinations of
mobility, mobilisation and endurance.
To understand migration and ‘who counts as a migrant’, we need to
understand their counterparts who do not migrate. To understand mobility,
we need to account for the relationship with those who do not move, but
mobilise to contest adversity or hunker down and endure it. In short, in
order to understand the powers to move and to mobilise, we need to pay
equal attention to staying power.
Can We Get More Specific? Migration Statistics and Policy Research
Madeleine Sumption
When governments make decisions on migration policy, they do so based on
an understanding of how and why migration takes place, who migrants are,
and what the socioeconomic impacts of migration policies will be. An
essential part of this understanding comes from statistics. Alongside qualita-
tive analysis that helps us ‘see inside’ the process of migration and integration
and quantitative data are crucial for assessing the scale and reach of a
phenomenon. Nationally representative statistics enable us to understand
the extent to which generalisations about the characteristics or activities of
particular migrant groups are valid, whether perceived problems warrant
action, or how many people a policy change is likely to affect.27 Indeed,
government officials make extensive use of statistical evidence as they for-
mulate policies as well as justify them to the public and press.28 Furthermore,
government agencies are often encouraged—or required—to quantify costs
and benefits of new policies.29
Given these observations, it is surprising that most statistics available to
migration researchers provide few opportunities to distinguish between dif-
ferent reasons for migration and legal channels through which people move.
This matters because, unlike much of the existing quantitative evidence,
government decisions on whom to grant admission or settlement—the core
of migration policy—cannot treat all migrants as interchangeable. Asylum
seekers, those joining family members, international students, employees and
entrepreneurs all face very different circumstances. Even policies that appear
to treat migration as a monolithic category, such as the UK’s target for
reducing net migration to below 100,000 (which includes people of all
citizenships and reasons for moving), must be implemented through a series
of changes to individual migration channels. If these policies are to be
224 W. ALLEN ET AL.
informed by quantitative evidence, they require data that enables at least
some consideration of the different routes through which people migrate.
Much of the quantitative research on migration concerns economic
impacts in countries of destination, particularly the effects on labour market
and public finances. Almost all the literature in this field defines ‘migrants’
by country of birth or nationality (the latter sometimes grouped) and year of
arrival. These studies receive considerable scrutiny in public and political
debates, often justifying generic statements such as ‘migrants boost public
finances’ or ‘migration drives down wages’. But many are not particularly
helpful as a guide to immigration policymaking because they typically com-
bine all migrants into an undifferentiated pool of people who in practice have
very different characteristics and were admitted to the country for different
reasons.30
But knowing the net contribution of the foreign born to public finances is
of relatively little practical use for policy. If policymakers want to adjust
migration policy based on evidence about its fiscal impacts, what matters is
whether the specific groups of people they plan admit or restrict are net
contributors and by how much—not what the average fiscal contribution of a
foreign-born person is. Understanding the potential impacts of policy
changes thus requires us to consider specific legal migration channels, rather
than generic ‘migration’.
The quality of migration statistics has improved dramatically in high-
income countries over the past twenty years. At least in high-income coun-
tries, where technical capacity and financial resources for data collection are
greatest, default variables on country of birth, nationality and year of arrival
are now widely available in household survey data and summary adminis-
trative statistics (i.e. visa records). However, the number of countries that
systematically collect good data that gives insight into both the social and
economic life of individuals and households and their reasons for migration
or the type of residence permit on which they arrived is still small.31
Key exceptions include Australia and New Zealand, which run dedicated
longitudinal surveys of people receiving permanent residence through differ-
ent legal routes; and the UK, which collects regular data in household surveys
on the self-reported reason for migration. Several countries have collected
one-off or ad hoc data on reason for migration, including EU countries as
part of two Eurostat Labour Force Survey modules, or the United States’
Princeton-based New Immigrant Survey. Others, such as Canada and
Sweden, have exploited administrative data from tax and employment
records to track migrants’ outcomes over time including by initial residence
permit type.
These more specific variables open up possibilities for breaking down
migration into different routes that approximate the legal categories under
which people were admitted. Of course, such categorisations will remain
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somewhat crude, ‘flattening’ the complex motivations that actually shape
migration decisions into a single ‘main reason’ or visa category. As with
any statistical exercise base on inevitably simplifying data, this is a limitation
that it is important to bear in mind when interpreting the results.
In the future, what kind of data does policy-orientated migration research
need? Firstly, administrative data are currently under-exploited.
Administrative data have two major benefits over survey data. They often
cover the entire population interacting with a particular government body or
service, greatly reducing the problems of small sample sizes that can make it
hard to analyse specific subgroups, as well as the problem of declining
response rates that many high-income countries have seen in their household
survey data.32 Also, administrative data are often longitudinal tracking the
same individuals over time, making it easier to identify the reasons for
changing trends. Administrative data can be more cost effective than survey
sources, especially compared to longitudinal surveys that require interviewers
to contact and re-contact individual interviewees.
Unlike survey data that are explicitly collected with statistical goals in
mind, administrative data are a by-product of government activities such as
the collection of taxes or delivery of public services. This can limit available
variables to information needed for a particular government process.
However, this can be resolved somewhat by linking datasets together (using
individual identifiers such as tax ID or passport numbers). Canada, for
example, has linked its tax and visa records, allowing it to track people
who entered the country on specific visa types and analyse their employment
and earnings several years later, providing a unique insight into whether
specific economic migration channels were successful in admitting people
with good integration prospects in Canada. But, despite these potential
benefits, administrative data are rarely developed into easily analysed formats
and are typically difficult for academics and government analysts to access
for research.
Secondly, governments could identify secure ways to make the complex set
of migration data sources more widely available to researchers outside of
government. Government statistics and analysis departments are constrained
by limited staffing, while non-government researchers have more freedom to
explore broader trends that are not tied to a policy agenda. Of course,
releasing potentially sensitive data into public use demands caution.
However, access can be improved such as ‘trusted’ researcher programmes,
secure data labs and portals that allow users to query data without accessing
individual records. Making a larger volume of survey and administrative
migration data systematically available would require resources but could
have an important payoff for knowledge about migration.
Thirdly, there needs to be more inquiry into the limitations of key
statistical sources and techniques—including linking different datasets—as
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well as piloting new methods of data collection to understand the role of
definitional and data collection discrepancies. This is particularly the case if
we become more demanding of data to analyse specific subgroups by reason
for migration. This should, over the long term, greatly improve the accuracy
of the statistics and their policy relevance.
Developing more detailed data on categories of migration is not without
hazards. Simply because we have somewhat more sophisticated data does not
mean that interpretations of the analysis will be sophisticated. Indeed, mak-
ing crude generalisations about ‘family migrants’ is just as problematic as
making crude generalisations about ‘migrants’ as a whole. Making the
migrant population more ‘legible’ by imposing a simplifying set of assump-
tions about reasons for migration could have potentially unwelcome effects.
It could facilitate a tendency to create hierarchies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
migrants based purely on available metrics of economic contribution, to
the detriment of non-economic considerations that are less easily
measurable.33
Nonetheless, moving away from binary categories of ‘migrants’ and ‘non-
migrants’, as well as examining different migration routes and motivations,
are necessary steps towards research that more closely reflects the complex-
ities of migration systems and processes. If policymaking informed by rele-
vant and systematic quantitative evidence is a desirable goal, it is difficult to
envisage much progress without making the data themselves more specific.
The 2015 Refugee Crisis, EU-Turkey Relations and Migration
Diplomacy
Franck Düvell
In 2017, the number of globally displaced persons reached a record
65 million people. Over a third, around 22 million, are from the wider
neighbourhood of the European Union. Of the 21.3 million who fled to
other countries and are categorised as refugees, around 3 million reside in
Turkey, 1.1 million in Lebanon, 980,000 in Iran and 660,000 in Jordan. From
spring 2015 around 1 million left Turkey, usually irregularly, first for Greece
and then on through the Balkans to Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary (later
Croatia), to Austria, Germany and Scandinavia. These movements are related
to multiple crises of displacement and EU border controls.
Turkey became a crucial actor in this drama. The country was confronted
with a number of simultaneous challenges and conflicts alongside the refugee
influx: social unrest in 2013 which became known as the Gezi park move-
ment; diminishing support for the ruling AKP party in the June 2015 elec-
tions; the 2015 resurgence of violence between the Turkish authorities and
the Kurdish movement; a series of terrorist attacks; and an attempted
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military coup in July 2016. Turkish President Erdoğan attempted to turn this
assemblage to his advantage.
From the beginning of the Syrian conflict until late 2015, Turkey had kept
its borders open to people from neighbouring countries. However, the
Directorate General for Migration Management rejected Syrians being legally
categorised as ‘refugees’ (mülteci), but preferred the term persons under
‘temporary protection’—or even suggested they are ‘guests’ (misafir), a cate-
gory of no legal meaning.34 Indeed, President Erdoğan designated them
‘Muslim brothers’ or ‘ummah’ in keeping with growing Islamisation and a
new foreign policy aiming at attaining regional leadership.35
For many years, Turkey had presented itself as generously hosting but also
shouldering disproportionate responsibility for displaced people, using the refu-
gee crisis to claim moral leadership. It bemoaned the lack of support from the
EU: ‘While Europe…closed their doors to refugees, only Turkey and a couple of
other countries welcomed the oppressed’, Erdoğan lamented.36 However, Turkey
did not or could not provide viable living conditions for migrants and refugees.
Accommodation is rarely provided; permission to work is rarely given; and
access to education and health—granted by law—often is not available in
practice.37 Scarcely surprisingly, people left Turkey in large numbers to move
to the EU.38
At the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the EU was complacent. People
were ‘waved through’ in Greece, Macedonia and Serbia and Croatia. Initial
public and policy responses in Sweden, Denmark and Germany were welcom-
ing. However, this began to be out-weighed by increasingly hostile constitu-
encies and governments in Hungary, Denmark, Austria and elsewhere.
Terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels fuelled anxiety and the rise of nation-
alist, often Euro-sceptic, parties including the Swedish Democrats, Danish
Peoples Party, AfD (Germany), FPO (Austria) and Front National (France).
From 2014, the EU and more particularly the European Commission
began to develop a policy mix that aimed to address root causes (violence,
poverty, and other drivers of onward migration), enhanced border con-
trols, improved reception systems, resettlement and relocation pro-
grammes, while returning those ineligible for international protection.
However, member states, preferring protectionist approaches, delayed or
refused to implement more liberal policies. Xenophobic responses com-
bined with an anti-EU narrative and revived or produced new alliances,
notably the Visegrad group of Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Poland and an Austria-led Balkan group.
This not only stalled most policies proposed by the Commission, but also
resulted in considerable conflict between different member states: EU
Commission President Juncker in his ‘state of the union’ speech suggested
‘our European Union is not in a good state’.39 (European Commission 2015).
EU Council President Tusk also dramatically asserted ‘the threat today is that
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of the disintegration of Europe,’40 and insisted ‘our main goal is to stem the
flow of migrants to Europe’.41
From October, the main goals were the closure of the so-called Balkan
route and ending departures from Turkey. The EU bargained with Turkey’s
long-standing aspiration for a more liberal travel regime and EU member-
ship: ‘Council President Donald Tusk warned Turkey that it will only win
concessions from the EU, such as easier travel visas, if it successfully reduces
the flow of refugees reaching Europe’.42 Yet migration flows gave Turkey new
leverage against the EU: Erdoğan needed to silence the EU over his heavy-
handed suppression of the opposition as well as demonstrate strength vis a
vis the EU in order to enhance his domestic position.
In November 2015, the EU-Turkey Action plan on Syrian refugees and
migration management was finally activated. In March 2016, an EU-Turkey
agreement came into force: the EU agreed to provide Turkey with €6 billion
for hosting refugees, to resettle some refugees from Turkey to the EU, grant
visa liberalisation by June 2016 and ‘re-energise the accession process’. In
return, Turkey was to accept readmission of returnees from the EU and ‘take
any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular
migration opening from Turkey to the EU’.43
Within weeks, irregular migration dropped to pre-crisis levels demonstrat-
ing that Turkey had the capacity to control its western sea borders. However,
few people were returned or settled, and six months after the agreed date,
visa liberalisation was still not approved as Turkey had not complied with the
‘remaining requirements’, while the accession process slowed down again.
On several occasions, Turkey threatened to abandon the agreement: ‘we can
open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria any time’ Erdoğan warned in
November 2016.44 However, the negotiations had won the EU time. In
November 2015, the Balkan route was closed. From February 2016, NATO
and Frontex border controls in the Aegean Sea were enhanced. Then, March
saw the establishment of so-called hot spots or reception centres on Greek
islands which people are not allowed to leave. Given these potentially power-
ful deterrents, the EU’s reliance on Turkey to prevent further migration has
significantly diminished—as has Turkey’s political leverage on migration. So
far, it seems that the EU managed to outplay Turkey and regained control.
Some years ago, at a conference in Madrid, a senior Frontex representative
argued that trying to stop migrants as they arrived at the borders was too late.
Instead, what was needed was more cooperation among neighbouring coun-
tries to prevent people reaching the European border in the first place.
Migration control is now widely acknowledged as a matter of regional
governance. This effectively means that ‘unwanted’ people are kept away
from affluent countries and contained elsewhere—an approach that has
been critically discussed as the externalisation of migration controls towards
third countries.45 Thus, relations between Turkey and the EU reveal how
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geographies of migration—expressed through phenomena and categories
such as transit routes, places of departure/arrival, hubs or origins—impart
a geopolitical dimension to migration governance. Indeed, mobility adds to
the assemblage of domestic and international affairs of affected countries,
impacting upon and driving changes in the power relations among states.
North Korean Defectors in South Korea: Is the Refugee Label Helpful?
Jennifer Hough
Since the 1990s, the number of people fleeing North Korea has increased
dramatically. While they currently constitute just 0.06% of the South Korean
population, in the context of continued North-South antagonism, they have
considerable symbolic importance in promoting the superiority of the South
Korean political system. South Korea’s refusal to recognise North Korean
sovereignty means that South Korean citizenship is extended to any ‘ethnic
Korean’ born on the peninsula.
The three most common terms used to refer to North Koreans in official
and popular discourse are t’albukcha (‘North Korean escapee/defector’),
saet’ŏmin (‘new settler’) and Pukhan i’tal chumin (‘Residents Who Escaped
North Korea’). This terminology has evolved alongside demographic and
policy changes since the 1990s, which contributed to North Koreans shifting
from ‘heroes’ to ‘burdens’.46 Prior to 1990, fewer than 600, primarily elite
North Koreans arrived. They were heavily compensated through a reward
system implemented by the South Korean military government in 1962, at
the height of the Cold War. However, as increasing numbers of non-elite
North Koreans started arriving in the 1990s due to famine throughout North
Korea, successive South Korean administrations enacted legislation which
significantly reduced the financial value of resettlement support and limited
most assistance programmes to five years.47 English-language terminology
also changed: the English translation of the 1997 Protection Act marked the
first official reference to North Koreans as ‘refugees’ where they had pre-
viously been called ‘defectors’. This semantic shift, with its greater implica-
tions of victimhood, is curious given that none of the Korean-language terms
include a sense of them as ‘refugees’.
The semantic shift from ‘defector’ to ‘refugee’ has coincided with geopo-
litical shifts. One of these is increased American influence in the South
Korean non-governmental sphere. Between 1999 and 2010 the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-independent grant-making orga-
nisation funded by the U.S. Congress donated up to $11.9 million to South
Korean organisations working towards the future ‘democratisation’ of North
Korea.48 Although U.S. influence has directed international attention to
North Korean human rights issues,49 some argue that this recent surge in
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human rights-related activity promotes a particular image of North Korea
with the aim of destabilising the North Korean government through the
securitisation and politicisation of knowledge claims about the country, in
line with U.S. geopolitical interests.50
Furthermore, there has been increased routinisation of the defection
process. The heavily militarised border between North and South Korea
means many North Koreans end up in China. During the 1990s, they
might have remained there for years, undocumented and at risk of repatria-
tion while earning money for the onward journey to South Korea. More
recently, however, the cost of defection has risen substantially as North
Koreans access more established brokerage networks, become more aware
of risks of remaining in China, and access currency facilitated by the partial
transition within North Korea from a planned to a market economy. Cross-
border bribes, costing $50 in 2008 had risen to thousands of dollars by 2015.
Consequently, would be defectors use money sent by relatives already in
South Korea, or alternatively use money earned through private enterprise in
addition to borrowing against their expected future resettlement payment.
The proliferation of names referring to North Koreans in South Korea sits
within these contexts. However, none enjoyed wholehearted endorsement
from the North Koreans I knew. They described t’albukcha (‘North Korean
escapees/defectors’) as disrespectful. Ŭnhyŏk (aged 25), a politics student at
university who had lived in South Korea for eight years, said, ‘It has a very
negative meaning—it implies that we’ve betrayed the North Korean system…
[But] we weren’t members of the [Korean Workers] Party…we just lived
normal lives.’ Some North Koreans also found sae’tŏmin (‘new settlers’)
vague and alienating. Mihyang (34), a housewife who had lived in South
Korea for a decade, said, ‘We are compatriots and yet they label us foreign-
ers…We are Korean (Han’guk saram) just the same, but they call me
sae’tŏmin… Frankly, I feel hurt when I hear it.’
While familiar with being referred to in English as ‘refugees,’ most
reacted negatively to this term. They did not want to be thought of as
victims—representations influenced by humanitarian campaigns that
depicted North Korea as poverty stricken. Oksim (23) had lived in South
Korea for ten months, having worked as a trader for four years before
leaving North Korea, earning upwards of $2,000 a year. She juxtaposed
early, largely sympathetic reactions from South Koreans to her more
recent experiences, saying, ‘I’ve slowly noticed that when I say t’albukcha,
I feel slightly ignored…People tend to naturally feel sorry for people
inferior to them…it’s like they don’t see you…They don’t think of you
as a Korean person’. She linked this victimised image to representations
offered by the popular entertainment show Ije Mannaro Kamnida (‘Now
On My Way To Meet You’), during which selected female North Koreans
described their escape stories—depictions she joined others in criticising
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for reinforcing the idea that North Korean women were ignorant victims
to be pitied.51 In the wake of such representation, time and again North
Koreans’ expectations that they would be respected as compatriots came
up against their experiences of feeling treated like objects of curiosity,
suspicion and pity.
These labels can be difficult to escape. Ch’unmi (41), a married graduate
student who had been living in South Korea for twelve years, observed, “Say I
lived in North Korea for ten years and then came and lived here for thirty
years. Even though I would have lived in South Korea for a longer time, they
would call me a Pukhan i’tal chumin (‘Resident Who Escaped North Korea’)
… How can that be?’ Ch’unmi linked the persistence of this label to inaccu-
rate public perceptions about North Koreans’ eligibility for long-term welfare
support. Instead, she suggested that if there were clear-cut and highly pub-
licised restrictions on how long North Koreans were eligible for welfare
benefits, the label might cease to be so closely associated with them.
(However, as a long-term South Korean resident, Ch’unmi was no longer
eligible for the majority of government assistance programmes, which per-
haps underpinned her resistance to labelling).
Sangch’ŏl (20) was one of a handful of interviewees who did not explicitly
resist being referred to as nanmin (‘refugee’). He said, ‘T’albukcha is techni-
cally accurate but we didn’t like it there at all. We escaped as victims…in that
respect, nanmin is accurate.’ Notably, he had only lived in South Korea for
three years. It suggests that North Koreans might be less opposed to being
called ‘refugees’ in the first years after arrival, because the label serves to
legitimate their rights to claim particular benefits.
Even as many North Koreans in South Korea appreciated the need for a
term to refer to them when they were the subject of policy and receiving
government support, their main criticism was that all these terms marked
them as different, separating them off as something other than simply
‘Korean’. Moreover, they react against their depictions as victims by
domestic and international media, and a perception reinforced by state
policy, non-state actors and continued reference to them as ‘refugees.’
Rather than recognising North Koreans’ rights as South Korean citizens,
depicting them as victims portrays response to their needs as a form of
charity presupposing relations of inequality.52 Further, this highlights their
contingent acceptance into South Korean society, which North Koreans
themselves contested. Were the differentiating effects of terminology
something North Koreans could ever escape? The common response that
they would be considered North Korean ‘until I die’ suggested they
thought not. However, this implies that without significant shifts in the
South Korean context, including greater recognition of North Koreans’
rights as citizens, their ability to contribute to broader social change will
continue to be constrained.
232 W. ALLEN ET AL.
Migration, State, and Religion: Conversion and Citizenship in
Germany
Lena Rose
Nadia53 left oppressive circumstances in Iran in search of economic oppor-
tunities and the freedom to develop herself. After a long journey, she arrived
at a refugee shelter in Germany in 2015, one of 1.1 million migrants mostly
from Middle Eastern countries.54 Amid a spectacular gesture of the 2015
‘summer of welcome’ from German civil society, volunteers from a small
evangelical Christian church welcomed and supported her. Curious about
their beliefs and keen to get to know locals, she attended church services.
After some months she converted to Christianity and was baptised.
By this point, the German authorities had already refused her application
for asylum due to the lack of a threat of ‘real’ persecution. However, her
conversion to evangelical Christianity changed her position significantly.
Nadia faced possible persecution in Iran prefigured by hostility from several
non-Christians at the refugee shelter. She sought sanctuary in her church
building and appealed the German state’s decision.
But at her second hearing, a grotesque situation unfolded: the judge
claimed Nadia had converted as a strategy to obstruct her return to Iran.
This judge—employed by a secular state—wanted to assess the validity of her
new-found faith. The small church that had accompanied Nadia on her
spiritual journey and acted ‘illegally’ by granting her sanctuary had already
catechised her well in a specially designed baptism course. So, she was able to
answer the judge’s questions about Jesus, her biblical knowledge, and how
she prayed. Although her answers were convincing, she was eventually sent
back to the third country through which she first entered the territory of the
European Union. This in turn shifted the decision about her possible return
to Iran to other authorities. During Nadia’s two hearings in Germany, her
nationality turned first against her and then worked in her favour, mediated
by her religious affiliation.
In a world divided into nation-states, every person is expected to have a
territorial and national identity in which they must be rooted. For many,
failure to stay put results in perceived ‘uprootedness’ and a condition of
‘displacement’.55 However, what if a person identifies primarily with other
affiliations, such as religious belief? What if ‘home’ lies in the future and can
only be fully attained in ‘paradise’? What if such migrants encounter ‘host’
citizens of Western liberal democracies who share the same beliefs? And
what do migrants’ religious beliefs reveal about a secular state’s assumptions
about religion, and what it means to be ‘Christian’?
Migrants’ affiliations beyond their nationality expose tensions among
migration, Western liberal states and religious belonging. Considering migra-
tion through the lens of religious belonging is not new. Levitt and Glick
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Schiller considered members of the same faith tradition as part of a ‘transna-
tional social field’.56 The lens of religion helps overcome the methodological
nationalism of much migration research, and bring into relief other affilia-
tions that may play a more important role in migrants’ lives. However, the
idea of a transnational social field neglects how relationships between the
members of respective religious communities in different locations are deter-
mined by cultural and historic aspects that distort notions of ‘continuity’.
In liberal democratic Western nation-states in particular, the figure of ‘the
migrant’ is often considered as threat to a seemingly homogenous ‘commu-
nity of value’57 and as the foreign ‘other’ against which a nation is defined.58
For example, after the welcome by German civil society in 2015, the atmo-
sphere changed. Concerns rose about resources, integration and the political
footholds the populist right achieved in various Federal States. Without
wanting to underplay people’s desire to help, it is notable that even in
2015, 92% of volunteers named ‘corporate feeling’ among themselves as
one of the major motivations in their engagement,59 thus in effect strength-
ening a feeling of ‘Us’ in their dealings with the ‘foreigner’.
Now, deeper questions are (re-)emerging about the ‘core values’ of German
society and their possible undermining or re-making through the ‘disruptive
migrant’. Traditional Christianity in Germany, in its Roman Catholic or
Protestant variety, forms part of the cultural aspects of such ‘core values’.
Thus, much migration scholarship has focused on the ‘integration’ of Muslims
in secular Western democracies with (at least nominal) Christian majorities.60
Islam (often reduced to a single narrative) is usually imagined as inherently
different to the ‘core values’ of liberal Western societies, leading to Huntington’s
famous ‘clash’ of ‘civilisations’.61 Moreover, in popular discourse, religious
identities are often coupled with nationality, as in ‘all Iraqis are Muslim’. This
links religion—rather than only national identity—with perceived threats posed
on a ‘community of value’ by the ‘Other’.
This suggests that in post-Enlightenment Western liberal democratic
states, there is a tension between ‘lived religion’ (i.e. religious belonging
and expression as one’s primary affiliation) and the secular state, rather
than with a particular religion per se. It might be easier for a Muslim apostate
to be welcomed in a Western Christian-influenced society than a newly
converted Christian migrant. Examining the German state’s dealing with
religious conversions and asylum claims ascribed to religious persecution,
as well as the encounters between Christians in Germany and the newly
arrived migrants, shows that the real struggle might lie in different religious
expression than a particular religion in itself. While a certain ambient
Christian faith can be counted among Germany’s ‘core values’, a lens on
the religious lives of migrants can reveal the complexity of religious tradi-
tions themselves, and their disruption through conversion of the ‘outsider’.
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Like Nadia, some Middle Eastern migrants are curious about Christianity
and attend Lutheran or Catholic services. Unlike the smaller evangelical
churches, many of these state churches are unprepared for this interest,
since the practice of conversion is alien to them: most church members are
born into their membership and have their denomination recorded in their
birth certificates. Requests to be baptised disrupts understandings of tradi-
tional Christianity, and as a result, the religious categorisation of migrants.
During some asylum application interviews, German officials meet converts
with exasperation. “Why did you have to convert in the first place?” they ask,
not comprehending why anybody would, for the sake of religion, put them-
selves into a situation that makes it necessary to leave their ‘home’, or risk
persecution on return, and seek shelter elsewhere.
The inability of a secular state with a Christian tradition to recognise ‘lived
religion’ leads to difficulties in formulating policies that meet migrants’ needs.
This is apparent in responses to harassment of Christians in religiously mixed
shelters. While evangelical churches raise awareness about this issue,62 suggest-
ing separate accommodation for Christians and Muslims, the established
Roman Catholic and Lutheran state churches refute such suggestions. They
refer to the state’s ‘core value’ of freedom of religion and the expectation that
migrants have to learn that ‘this is how things work here’.63 Furthermore, the
Berlin Senate’s ‘Master Plan for Integration and Security’ did not include any
clause for the protection of religious minorities, which was only inserted
following the pressure of the largest network of evangelical organisations. Still,
religion is not recorded during the first registration of migrants, making the idea
of separate shelters according to religious belonging practically impossible.
The presence of religious migrants and new forms of religious persecution in
Germany reveal differences between what it means to be ‘German’ and ‘reli-
gious’. Is Nadia ‘other’ because she is Iranian, or because she is now an
evangelical Christian convert rather than a member of a state church? The
presence of religious migrants also further complicates the distinction between
‘migrant’ and ‘citizen’. By taking Nadia in, didn’t members of the church decide
that her membership of their community was more important than following
the German state’s laws? In total, migrants not only highlight methodological
nationalism in our thinking, but also challenge theoretical, political and policy
understandings of religious communities and their relation to states.
Home, Homelessness and ‘Go Home’: Scales of Migration Governance
in the European Union
Rachel Humphris and Sarah Walker
For generations, Roma have been excluded and marginalised from European
societies. Today, their experiences provide a lens through which we can
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examine the shifting and heterogeneous nature of borders within and beyond
Europe. Interrogating migration governance through the case of Romanian
Roma in London is particularly productive at this moment of ‘crisis’ in the
European Union. London is both a global metropolis and centre of migration
—a spectacle of the shifting forms of the European border. It is a site where
scales of governance from local administration to the European and transna-
tional intersect in visible ways. Exploring the spatio-racialised governance of
Roma sheds light on how borders shift and categories of the ‘migrant’ are (re)
made. Who is in a position of control in relation to movement? Who can be
where? Who is considered to be part of what community?
Beggars are a socially excluded group consisting of both citizens (national and
EU) and non-citizens. The beggar can encompass the non-migrant, the vagrant,
the outcast and the person who formally belongs to the ‘community’, but who
does not belong to ‘the community of value’.64 As such, begging reveals fractures
between legal and normative statuses ascribed to citizenship. In the ‘worker-
citizen’ ideal, the citizen contributes to the community of value through work.
Though the beggar may be a citizen, the ‘work’ of begging is considered as
gaining something for nothing, unproductive and thus dishonourable and not
‘work’. As such, beggars are excluded from consideration as self-sufficient
citizens by virtue of their perceived idleness and dishonourable behaviour. The
figure of the beggar exposes how citizenship is based on hierarchies of values
and a moral economy of labour where some work does not count as work at all
and is insufficient for inclusion in the citizenship body.65
Begging has been illegal in England and Wales since the 1824 Vagrancy Act.
Other tools of governance include the ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Order’ (ASBO),
introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Begging is deviant behaviour
and justifies exclusion from public space and sight. Control of public space can
be seen as the control of ‘disorder’: thus, immigration policies and securitisa-
tion discourses feed into control measures around public space, leading to
increased criminalisation of behaviours. Walters described these mechanisms
of exclusion as domopolitics (i.e. governing the state like a home), pointing to
the ‘equation between enhanced immigration and asylum controls and a
heightened sense of citizenship and community within society’.66 Legislation
has the additional function of constructing a certain image of social identity
into which deviants do not fit and thus are viewed as ‘other’.
Processes of othering and securitisation of migration are inextricably
linked to images and imaginaries. The suspect mobility of Roma as an
unwanted population draws on long established artefacts of racialisation
linked to ‘Gypsies’. In the case of Roma migrants, a discourse of stigmatised
representations cast all homeless Roma as beggars, despite evidence to the
contrary.67 Representations of Roma as nomadic beggars and thieves are
implicit in policy responses and reproduce the idea that Roma are not fully
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European.68 Wherever Roma settle, they are portrayed as belonging
elsewhere.
The notion that migrant Roma possess a ‘culture of begging’ justified a
number of responses at different scales. The local authority where we under-
took our research had commissioned a national homelessness charity and a
Roma charity to ‘understand’ the Roma ‘culture of begging’. Spurred by the
phenomenon of Roma beggars, a ‘cross-border enforcement group’ for rough
sleeping had been reinstated, consisting of the Mayor of London’s Rough
Sleeping Group, in collaboration with London Local Authorities, voluntary
sector organisations (VSOs) working with rough sleepers, the police and the
Home Office. In addition, state authorities in Romania were brought into the
operation as experts on managing ‘their Roma’. The British Transport Police
had participated in a mission to Romania to collaborate and share learning
with the Romanian police on identifying and managing Roma populations.
Further legislation has enabled increasing control over public spaces. In
October 2014, ‘public spaces protection orders’ (PSPOs), were introduced
under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, allowing councils
to ban any activity they judge to have a ‘detrimental effect’ on the ‘quality of
life’ of an area.
Introducing new legislation to criminalise unwanted behaviour in certain
areas is a long-standing technique of enforcing immigration laws through
crime and therefore undermining the conferring of rights on migrants.69 In
several wealthy EU member states, anti-begging legislation is increasingly
used to remove unproductive migrants. For example, in May 2016, the UK
Home Office made rough sleeping an abuse of the right to freedom of
movement, paving the way for increased ‘administrative removals’.70
Management of begging becomes a mechanism to control the migration of
Roma, further solidifying their status as the figure of the unwanted EU
migrant. The spaces frequented by Roma who beg are regulated and con-
trolled: from the micro-level of the local authority and the criminalisation of
inhabiting very small spaces such as doorways, to the transnational European
level via cooperation among the Home Office, the Metropolitan police and
the Romanian police. The citizen beggar can be removed from the street
through PSPOs and the Vagrancy Act, but the Roma beggar can be removed
from the space of the nation-state through the collaboration of immigration
enforcement with VSOs.
Governance mechanisms are simultaneously becoming hyper-local and
extra-national, ‘exemplifying strategies of ‘remote control’ (to prevent ‘unde-
sirable’ migrants reaching EU Member States) and ‘internal controls’ (to eject
them afterwards).71 The movement of the Roma beggar embodies this multi-
layered governance enacted by an ever more complex array of institutional
actors. These multi-level scales of governance work as forms of ‘everyday
bordering’72, whereby VSOs are co-opted into the enforcement of borders.
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The grey legal areas around European Union citizens’ rights add a layer of
complexity in implementing laws and policies on the ground opening spaces
of discretion for front line workers. These commissioning and sub-
contracting arrangements also restrict the spaces where alternative narratives
regarding Roma migrants might emerge.
Roma challenge the notion of the citizen as subjects of constant devaluation
(economically and symbolically), contributing to an understanding of how
membership is continually negotiated, produced and contested. Roma migrants
found begging are read and interpreted through many different systems of
inscription that are attributed through dominant symbolic systems with nega-
tive value. The case of migrant Roma found begging starkly reveals how
membership does not rest on a body being tied to the territory of the nation-
state (and being one that works or labours), but rather a body fit and morally
valued for the practices the state promotes. This shift represents a continuing
process of ‘differential inclusion’73 where territory, membership and access to
social rights are increasingly fragmented and the ‘boundaries between inclusion
and exclusion become pressed and confused’.74 Representations and techniques
of governing coalesce to brand beggars as outsiders, all homeless Roma as
beggars and thus all Roma as the quintessential outsider whose presence justifies
and requires extra-national assistance. Roma represent how Europe is consti-
tuted as a political project and linked to identity politics based on a certain
morality of labour and behaviour—from which Roma and others are excluded.
Historically, Roma have been strongly imagined as Europe’s internal ‘other’.
The stigmatisation of Roma migrants manifests itself in the ethnicisation and
heightened criminal enforcement of begging. Suspect Roma mobility is in stark
contrast to the right of free movement for EU citizen-workers. In light of Brexit,
largely driven by fears of ‘excessive’ free movement of EU migrants, the
category of the unwanted EU migrant is expanding beyond Roma. The treat-
ment and governance of Roma are an early indicator of advancing forms of
migration governance. A finer-grained ethnographic approach is one way to
grasp the complex and shifting ‘power-geometries’75 and their effects on those
on the geographical and social margins of society. More generally, researchers
need to respond with new methodological approaches to identify and unpick
the effects of new partnerships, funding arrangements, targets and categorisa-
tions at different levels of migration governance. These have important con-
sequences for notions of membership and belonging which in turn are part of
shifting configurations in an increasingly uncertain Europe.
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